Twin's turn up gas on Hot Stove early
The Twins, in contrast to several recent off-seasons, have emerged as one of the most active teams in the early off-season in less than a week since the wrap of the post-season they have made two moves that quickly answered possible questions about how the Twins will build their lineup for 2010 as well as what players they prioritized keeping most.
Unsurprisingly they picked Michael Cuddyer's club option for the 2011 season as they were both under a time-crunch to make a decision about that year since they had to make up their minds on the 2011 option year within 5 days of the end of this year's World Series and they retain for a relatively competitive price a player who will be 32 in 2011 who is coming off a very productive and cost-effective year. Their choice boiled down to letting him walk as a free agent after next year after having paid him $24 million for the three years from 2008-2010 or pick up the option and pay him another $10.5 million for the final year when he will be 32. For the $8 million annualized salary they paid him in 2009 they got what was likely an outlier of a season, but for $8 million getting 32 HR, 73 XBH and 94 RBI is an extremely high return on their investment. While his career totals suggest that his SLG of .520 in 2009 is likely about .050 higher than what the Twins can expect out of him in 2010 and 2011 this move was a no-brainer from both a public relations standpoint and team building standpoint. Making the choice to not commit beyond 2010, for a relatively affordable price, to the player who is the the only right-handed power bat on the team and who is coming off a stellar, 30+ HR season would show little commitment to building on this year's success in 2010 and beyond. As the Twins move into their new largely publicly funded stadium, showing that the increased revenues from higher ticket prices, team-controlled luxury suites, et cetera, will be used to prevent teams from poaching our best players who are allowed to hit free agency thus keeping us in constant semi-rebuilding mode will be an important PR goal. While Cuddyer is a nice start obviously the real litmus test here will be if Joe Mauer can be resigned. More important than the PR relevane of the move, though, at 32 Cuddyer's production will likely not be significantly worse than his career mean, and with inflation between now and 2011 $10.5 million for a dependable, above average right-handed power bat will at least be justifiable if not somewhat of a bargain, especially considering the need to insert a rightie into the lineup whose most talented hitters are all left-handed--Mauer, Morneau and Kubel. The Twins thus keep an important role-player and a guy who while far from a gold-glove fielder has both an above average arm in right and some defensive versatility that he displayed by doing a competent job filling in for Morneau at first base at the end of this last season.
Much less predictable and a much less typical move for the Twins to make, especially so early in the off-season, was a somewhat unusual deal where the Twins sent a young but still very far from developed outfield prospect in Carlos Gomez to the Brewers for a former All-Star shortstop J.J. Hardy who has struggled mightily his last two seasons after appearing in 2008 to be part of a core of young talent around which the Brewers would build their team. While neither player seems like particularly attractive trade bait (Hardy is coming off an abysmal year and Gomez has not blossomed into a productive hitter since being acquired in the Santana deal) the trade does actually make a fair amount of sense for both clubs who may both benefit, and in my opinion, particularly the Twins could have pulled off a real coup here even if the likely outcome is marginal improvement. I believe this trade has more inherent risk for the Brewers since Hardy's abilities have been borne out by real world experience and him performing at a high level would be returning to a previous level of performance as opposed to having a breakout season, but either team could in retrospect appear very foolish if one of these players surprises and plays especially well. However, I think it is more likely that a year from now this trade may have improved both teams in a measurable but not profound way and will not be seen as mistake (at least not a major mistake) for either front office.
While Gomez was the most prominent player acquired in the Santana trade and the only player from that deal to see significant MLB playing time, he was in practice a 4th outfielder and with usual DH Jason Kubel's ability to play a passable if mediocre right-field if needed due to an injury to an outfielder, he was really one of 5 viable options in the outfield, of which he was by far the weakest at the plate. While his fielding was so stellar as to make up in large part for his lack of production at the plate and in my opinion justified his playing time over Delmon Young when the latter was struggling offensively, Gomez will likely never be more than a defensive specialist center fielder on a team that lacks a more offensively productive player at that position unless he significantly improves his plate discipline. While Gomez exuded sheer athleticism and at times was an extremely exciting offensive player (for instance, hitting for the cycle in 2008 and often taking an extra base on sheer speed) at the plate in just over 1000 big league at bats he's had rather mediocre numbers, unable to translate his athletic gifts into MLB production, batting just .248, getting on base less than 3 of 10 trips to the plate at .292 and OPSing a mere .638. As he will only be 24 next season and he already has been playing in the bigs for 3 seasons, it might be the case he has suffered from overly fast promotion, and that he may develop a better ability to translate muscles and speed into power, on base percentage, and base-stealing prowess, but so far he has not shown signs of being on the cusp of being an important MLB talent.
In Hardy the Twins acquire a player who has proven that he has the ability to put together a productive full season at the plate while playing at an above average level at the crucial defensive position of short-stop. He played nearly all of 2007 and 2008 (playing 151 and 146 games respectively) and putting up a total line of .280/.340/.470 averaged over those two full seasons, hitting 26 and 24 HR and making the All-Star team in 2008. In those two seasons his fielding was at least above average, 10th best in MLB at SS at +7 for 2007 based on The Fielding Bible's +/- system, and even at an outstanding level, +19 in 2008 and 4th in MLB. Even if his 2009 struggles at the plate were more than a fluke (his line at the MLB level last year was a disappointing .229/.302/.357 that earned him a demotion to AAA 2 days before he would accrued enough playing time to have qualified for Free Agency after 2010 instead of after 2011) he nets the Twins at least a possible medium-term solution at short-stop, a position that aside from Orlando Cabrera's brief tenure there in this year's pennant race has been a constant source of instability and has featured a revolving door of players, none of whom were particular talented hitters, since Jason Bartlett was dealt along with Matt Garza for Delmon Young and Brendan Harris. A note on Hardy's demotion last year: as mentioned in passing, while going from being an All-Star to earning a demotion to AAA in a year doesn't generally make them more attractive trade fodder, Hardy's demotion could have been strategic on Milwaukee's part, as Alcides Escobar's breakout year allowed the Brewers the flexibility to demote Hardy which resulted in the Brewers or now the Twins maintaining control over Hardy for two years instead of one, surely a huge factor in this trade.
This trade does not look unbalanced for either team from the outset, as both teams traded from positions of relative strength: the Brewers gave up a player who would have become a possibly divisive clubhouse presence as well as likely ending up a relatively expensive back-up shortstop for the youngster Escobar (Hardy is set to make $4.65 million in 2010 and has another arbitration year in 2011.) The Twins will retain control of Hardy for two years at least and will get a full two seasons to see if 2009 was flukishly bad and even if he can't repeat the .821 OPS of his 2008 season if a .750ish OPS-hitting, above average fielding SS could be part of their long-term plans.
In exchange for this buy-low addition for the Twins, they give up 4 years of control of an athletically gifted prospect who once was projected to have a very high ceiling, but who has had a lot of that promise fade now after about 2 full seasons worth of at bats over 3 years at the MLB level where his production has never surpassed mediocre for any extended period of time. On the other hand, while the Brewers are not exactly lacking for an outfield Mike Cameron is getting older and having Gomez on the bench gives the Brewers a number of advantageous ways to use Gomez's speed, stellar defense and skill at bunting for hits (bizarrely accompanied by an unacceptable lack of skill at executing a sacrifice bunt) all mean he could find a niche as a bench player in Milwaukee, potentially being used as a pinch runner, late game defensive replacement and perhaps as a pinch hitter in certain situations with less than two outs where the Brewers want to put pressure on a team's infield. He also gives the Brewers outfield depth they were lacking by providing top-tier defense and at least intermittent offensive production as a potential replacement for an injured player. Gomez's speed and ability to read the ball off the bat have lead him to rack up in full-time play in 2008 and part-time play in 2009 +/- numbers of +29, easily #1 in MLB in 2008, and +17, #4 in MLB in 2009 while only playing about 2/3 of a season's worth of innings. While not making up for his below-average plate performance, as an overall player the number of runs he takes away from other teams relative to the average CF's performance are significantly above average and partially compensate for a lack of consistent output at the plate thus far in his young career; all in all even if he doesn't break out and develop significantly he gives the Brewers a very solid and versatile bench player and a serviceable backup if they have injuries in the outfield.
After the Garza/Bartlett for Young/Harris debacle, this is really the second major trade of the Bill Smith era that is a talent-for-talent deal where both teams could have walked away but in the end thought they they each will benefit; the Santana trade certainly might have played out better but the strategic disadvantage of being unable to resign Santana forced Smith to strike some deal sending away his ace pitcher. While the talent involved in this deal is not as valuable or high-profile as the Tampa Bay deal, in this case the Twins are on the right side of a trade where a proven but somewhat inconsistent MLB talent is dealt for a young, unproven outfield prospect who has shown promise but not real production in the show. In the near-term the Twins gain two years of a cost-controlled player who could easily shore up or at the outer edge of probability provide above average play at short-stop, a position that has been a consistent liability for the Twins. If Hardy can prove that 2009 was in fact merely a fluke year and Smith can extend him he may come away from this deal looking very smart indeed. If Hardy's struggles prove more permanent then the Twins are basically where they were before since both players on the left side of their infield (1 year rentals in Orlando Cabrera and Joe Crede) are almost certainly not going to be resigned as free agents. In exchange for this low-risk, high-reward potential Smith dealt a nice player in Gomez, but a player who, even with injuries in the outfield, was hard to find playing time for due to the glut of more talented outfielders the Twins carry; while Gomez's defense was stellar, unless he can make a drastic improvement at the plate, hit for more power, better average, and draw more walks, he will never be the type of valuable everyday CF that the Twins already have in Denard Span. While the Twins outfield defense with both Span and Gomez patrolling seemed that nearly any fly ball that was not a homer would be caught, the Twins will go forward with a more productive offensive outfield and a center-fielder who is no defensive slouch in Denard Span, accompanied by Young and Cuddyer in left and right with Kubel able to fill in if there is an injury.
So while both teams seem like they will be improved by this deal as they trade from areas of redundancy for areas of want, the Brewers seem to be at much greater risk of looking foolish a few years from now. Hardy was an All-Star the year before last, is a very talented fielder, and if he proves that 2007 and 2008 are better reflections of his actual skill level than a lost year in 2009, the Twins could come away from the deal with a very talented everyday player at a difficult to fill position. If Hardy does not pan out the Twins will only come away looking like losers in this trade if Gomez dramatically improves his offensive performance which would involve improving such basic skills as learning how to better identify strikes, take more pitches and work counts, predict what pitch is likely coming, protect the plate with two strikes, and develop power to boot. It's a tall order, but time is on Gomez's side: he's still only 23. However, the chance that a 28 year old former All-Star will play at a reasonably high level after one off year seems much greater than the chances that an offensive work in progress will turn raw athleticism into consistent production. It's sad to see Go-go go (my one very nice Twins jersey is a Gomez jersey, ironically enough) I'm very excited that Smith pulled off a seeming coup in getting a player with the upside and proven record of Hardy for a guy who has not shown any real reason to expect development into a team-changing producer. While I loved Gomez's defense, hustle and occasionally very exciting play, he has never shown an ability to cope with MLB pitching in 1000+ at bats over three seasons; he still does not see enough pitches, looks confused or simply over-matched throughout at bats, and frequently winds up striking out after 3 or 4 pitches hacking wildly at strike three or conversely being frozen by a pitch far too close to take.
With the shortstop situation in Milwaukee along with the Brewer's keen decision to keep control of Hardy through 2011 it is obvious that they had an eye on trading him this off-season, however, for Smith to work out a deal for a former All-Star SS for a redundant and purely speculative talent whose entire hitting approach is seriously flawed is something of a coup, if a small one, as it would seem that Hardy's 2007 and 2008 production, despite his recent struggles, would be enough to net at the very least a single, younger blue chip prospect or a group of prospects. That the deal was worked out without sending away any young pitching is a pleasant surprise. It could turn out that this deal is forgettable if Hardy turns out to be an average or below average SS for two years and Gomez is a passable bench player or fill-in in Milwaukee, but the likely upside seems to be all on the Twins side. Smith's second decision to pull the trigger on a major trade, in short, seems to have been informed by the backward risk-reward picture embodied in the Garza trade, as this time we are highly unlikely to be the team regretting this trade in a year.
Unsurprisingly they picked Michael Cuddyer's club option for the 2011 season as they were both under a time-crunch to make a decision about that year since they had to make up their minds on the 2011 option year within 5 days of the end of this year's World Series and they retain for a relatively competitive price a player who will be 32 in 2011 who is coming off a very productive and cost-effective year. Their choice boiled down to letting him walk as a free agent after next year after having paid him $24 million for the three years from 2008-2010 or pick up the option and pay him another $10.5 million for the final year when he will be 32. For the $8 million annualized salary they paid him in 2009 they got what was likely an outlier of a season, but for $8 million getting 32 HR, 73 XBH and 94 RBI is an extremely high return on their investment. While his career totals suggest that his SLG of .520 in 2009 is likely about .050 higher than what the Twins can expect out of him in 2010 and 2011 this move was a no-brainer from both a public relations standpoint and team building standpoint. Making the choice to not commit beyond 2010, for a relatively affordable price, to the player who is the the only right-handed power bat on the team and who is coming off a stellar, 30+ HR season would show little commitment to building on this year's success in 2010 and beyond. As the Twins move into their new largely publicly funded stadium, showing that the increased revenues from higher ticket prices, team-controlled luxury suites, et cetera, will be used to prevent teams from poaching our best players who are allowed to hit free agency thus keeping us in constant semi-rebuilding mode will be an important PR goal. While Cuddyer is a nice start obviously the real litmus test here will be if Joe Mauer can be resigned. More important than the PR relevane of the move, though, at 32 Cuddyer's production will likely not be significantly worse than his career mean, and with inflation between now and 2011 $10.5 million for a dependable, above average right-handed power bat will at least be justifiable if not somewhat of a bargain, especially considering the need to insert a rightie into the lineup whose most talented hitters are all left-handed--Mauer, Morneau and Kubel. The Twins thus keep an important role-player and a guy who while far from a gold-glove fielder has both an above average arm in right and some defensive versatility that he displayed by doing a competent job filling in for Morneau at first base at the end of this last season.
Much less predictable and a much less typical move for the Twins to make, especially so early in the off-season, was a somewhat unusual deal where the Twins sent a young but still very far from developed outfield prospect in Carlos Gomez to the Brewers for a former All-Star shortstop J.J. Hardy who has struggled mightily his last two seasons after appearing in 2008 to be part of a core of young talent around which the Brewers would build their team. While neither player seems like particularly attractive trade bait (Hardy is coming off an abysmal year and Gomez has not blossomed into a productive hitter since being acquired in the Santana deal) the trade does actually make a fair amount of sense for both clubs who may both benefit, and in my opinion, particularly the Twins could have pulled off a real coup here even if the likely outcome is marginal improvement. I believe this trade has more inherent risk for the Brewers since Hardy's abilities have been borne out by real world experience and him performing at a high level would be returning to a previous level of performance as opposed to having a breakout season, but either team could in retrospect appear very foolish if one of these players surprises and plays especially well. However, I think it is more likely that a year from now this trade may have improved both teams in a measurable but not profound way and will not be seen as mistake (at least not a major mistake) for either front office.
While Gomez was the most prominent player acquired in the Santana trade and the only player from that deal to see significant MLB playing time, he was in practice a 4th outfielder and with usual DH Jason Kubel's ability to play a passable if mediocre right-field if needed due to an injury to an outfielder, he was really one of 5 viable options in the outfield, of which he was by far the weakest at the plate. While his fielding was so stellar as to make up in large part for his lack of production at the plate and in my opinion justified his playing time over Delmon Young when the latter was struggling offensively, Gomez will likely never be more than a defensive specialist center fielder on a team that lacks a more offensively productive player at that position unless he significantly improves his plate discipline. While Gomez exuded sheer athleticism and at times was an extremely exciting offensive player (for instance, hitting for the cycle in 2008 and often taking an extra base on sheer speed) at the plate in just over 1000 big league at bats he's had rather mediocre numbers, unable to translate his athletic gifts into MLB production, batting just .248, getting on base less than 3 of 10 trips to the plate at .292 and OPSing a mere .638. As he will only be 24 next season and he already has been playing in the bigs for 3 seasons, it might be the case he has suffered from overly fast promotion, and that he may develop a better ability to translate muscles and speed into power, on base percentage, and base-stealing prowess, but so far he has not shown signs of being on the cusp of being an important MLB talent.
In Hardy the Twins acquire a player who has proven that he has the ability to put together a productive full season at the plate while playing at an above average level at the crucial defensive position of short-stop. He played nearly all of 2007 and 2008 (playing 151 and 146 games respectively) and putting up a total line of .280/.340/.470 averaged over those two full seasons, hitting 26 and 24 HR and making the All-Star team in 2008. In those two seasons his fielding was at least above average, 10th best in MLB at SS at +7 for 2007 based on The Fielding Bible's +/- system, and even at an outstanding level, +19 in 2008 and 4th in MLB. Even if his 2009 struggles at the plate were more than a fluke (his line at the MLB level last year was a disappointing .229/.302/.357 that earned him a demotion to AAA 2 days before he would accrued enough playing time to have qualified for Free Agency after 2010 instead of after 2011) he nets the Twins at least a possible medium-term solution at short-stop, a position that aside from Orlando Cabrera's brief tenure there in this year's pennant race has been a constant source of instability and has featured a revolving door of players, none of whom were particular talented hitters, since Jason Bartlett was dealt along with Matt Garza for Delmon Young and Brendan Harris. A note on Hardy's demotion last year: as mentioned in passing, while going from being an All-Star to earning a demotion to AAA in a year doesn't generally make them more attractive trade fodder, Hardy's demotion could have been strategic on Milwaukee's part, as Alcides Escobar's breakout year allowed the Brewers the flexibility to demote Hardy which resulted in the Brewers or now the Twins maintaining control over Hardy for two years instead of one, surely a huge factor in this trade.
This trade does not look unbalanced for either team from the outset, as both teams traded from positions of relative strength: the Brewers gave up a player who would have become a possibly divisive clubhouse presence as well as likely ending up a relatively expensive back-up shortstop for the youngster Escobar (Hardy is set to make $4.65 million in 2010 and has another arbitration year in 2011.) The Twins will retain control of Hardy for two years at least and will get a full two seasons to see if 2009 was flukishly bad and even if he can't repeat the .821 OPS of his 2008 season if a .750ish OPS-hitting, above average fielding SS could be part of their long-term plans.
In exchange for this buy-low addition for the Twins, they give up 4 years of control of an athletically gifted prospect who once was projected to have a very high ceiling, but who has had a lot of that promise fade now after about 2 full seasons worth of at bats over 3 years at the MLB level where his production has never surpassed mediocre for any extended period of time. On the other hand, while the Brewers are not exactly lacking for an outfield Mike Cameron is getting older and having Gomez on the bench gives the Brewers a number of advantageous ways to use Gomez's speed, stellar defense and skill at bunting for hits (bizarrely accompanied by an unacceptable lack of skill at executing a sacrifice bunt) all mean he could find a niche as a bench player in Milwaukee, potentially being used as a pinch runner, late game defensive replacement and perhaps as a pinch hitter in certain situations with less than two outs where the Brewers want to put pressure on a team's infield. He also gives the Brewers outfield depth they were lacking by providing top-tier defense and at least intermittent offensive production as a potential replacement for an injured player. Gomez's speed and ability to read the ball off the bat have lead him to rack up in full-time play in 2008 and part-time play in 2009 +/- numbers of +29, easily #1 in MLB in 2008, and +17, #4 in MLB in 2009 while only playing about 2/3 of a season's worth of innings. While not making up for his below-average plate performance, as an overall player the number of runs he takes away from other teams relative to the average CF's performance are significantly above average and partially compensate for a lack of consistent output at the plate thus far in his young career; all in all even if he doesn't break out and develop significantly he gives the Brewers a very solid and versatile bench player and a serviceable backup if they have injuries in the outfield.
After the Garza/Bartlett for Young/Harris debacle, this is really the second major trade of the Bill Smith era that is a talent-for-talent deal where both teams could have walked away but in the end thought they they each will benefit; the Santana trade certainly might have played out better but the strategic disadvantage of being unable to resign Santana forced Smith to strike some deal sending away his ace pitcher. While the talent involved in this deal is not as valuable or high-profile as the Tampa Bay deal, in this case the Twins are on the right side of a trade where a proven but somewhat inconsistent MLB talent is dealt for a young, unproven outfield prospect who has shown promise but not real production in the show. In the near-term the Twins gain two years of a cost-controlled player who could easily shore up or at the outer edge of probability provide above average play at short-stop, a position that has been a consistent liability for the Twins. If Hardy can prove that 2009 was in fact merely a fluke year and Smith can extend him he may come away from this deal looking very smart indeed. If Hardy's struggles prove more permanent then the Twins are basically where they were before since both players on the left side of their infield (1 year rentals in Orlando Cabrera and Joe Crede) are almost certainly not going to be resigned as free agents. In exchange for this low-risk, high-reward potential Smith dealt a nice player in Gomez, but a player who, even with injuries in the outfield, was hard to find playing time for due to the glut of more talented outfielders the Twins carry; while Gomez's defense was stellar, unless he can make a drastic improvement at the plate, hit for more power, better average, and draw more walks, he will never be the type of valuable everyday CF that the Twins already have in Denard Span. While the Twins outfield defense with both Span and Gomez patrolling seemed that nearly any fly ball that was not a homer would be caught, the Twins will go forward with a more productive offensive outfield and a center-fielder who is no defensive slouch in Denard Span, accompanied by Young and Cuddyer in left and right with Kubel able to fill in if there is an injury.
So while both teams seem like they will be improved by this deal as they trade from areas of redundancy for areas of want, the Brewers seem to be at much greater risk of looking foolish a few years from now. Hardy was an All-Star the year before last, is a very talented fielder, and if he proves that 2007 and 2008 are better reflections of his actual skill level than a lost year in 2009, the Twins could come away from the deal with a very talented everyday player at a difficult to fill position. If Hardy does not pan out the Twins will only come away looking like losers in this trade if Gomez dramatically improves his offensive performance which would involve improving such basic skills as learning how to better identify strikes, take more pitches and work counts, predict what pitch is likely coming, protect the plate with two strikes, and develop power to boot. It's a tall order, but time is on Gomez's side: he's still only 23. However, the chance that a 28 year old former All-Star will play at a reasonably high level after one off year seems much greater than the chances that an offensive work in progress will turn raw athleticism into consistent production. It's sad to see Go-go go (my one very nice Twins jersey is a Gomez jersey, ironically enough) I'm very excited that Smith pulled off a seeming coup in getting a player with the upside and proven record of Hardy for a guy who has not shown any real reason to expect development into a team-changing producer. While I loved Gomez's defense, hustle and occasionally very exciting play, he has never shown an ability to cope with MLB pitching in 1000+ at bats over three seasons; he still does not see enough pitches, looks confused or simply over-matched throughout at bats, and frequently winds up striking out after 3 or 4 pitches hacking wildly at strike three or conversely being frozen by a pitch far too close to take.
With the shortstop situation in Milwaukee along with the Brewer's keen decision to keep control of Hardy through 2011 it is obvious that they had an eye on trading him this off-season, however, for Smith to work out a deal for a former All-Star SS for a redundant and purely speculative talent whose entire hitting approach is seriously flawed is something of a coup, if a small one, as it would seem that Hardy's 2007 and 2008 production, despite his recent struggles, would be enough to net at the very least a single, younger blue chip prospect or a group of prospects. That the deal was worked out without sending away any young pitching is a pleasant surprise. It could turn out that this deal is forgettable if Hardy turns out to be an average or below average SS for two years and Gomez is a passable bench player or fill-in in Milwaukee, but the likely upside seems to be all on the Twins side. Smith's second decision to pull the trigger on a major trade, in short, seems to have been informed by the backward risk-reward picture embodied in the Garza trade, as this time we are highly unlikely to be the team regretting this trade in a year.
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